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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 18:10
Originally posted by Bankotsu Bankotsu wrote:


 
I would like a neutral party to give an assessment of the above passage of the polish foreign minister's speech at the United Nations.

The minister made the following statement:

That treaty was designed to channel German aggression eastward.

How is the above statement to be interpreted?

 
Since you apparently missed it the first time I posted it, I repeat it again.  This is exactly what you are doing in order to twist what the source is saying to appear to say the opposite of what it is actually saying.  YOU CANNOT DETERMINE THE MEANING OUT OF CONTEXT.
 
 
Originally posted by Bankotsu Bankotsu wrote:

What misrepresentation?
 
 
I make the following statement:
 
 
"We are told the following.  That Hitler was good for Germany.  Further, Stalin was also a good leader for the Soviet Union.  Hitler's and Stalin's leadership benefited the peoples they governed.  But that is a pack of lies.  Both of them killed millions of the people that they governed."
 
Then you come along and quote an extract from what I said as follows:
 
"... Hitler was good for Germany.  Further, Stalin was also a good leader for the Soviet Union.  Hitler's and Stalin's leadership benefited the peoples they governed...."
 
You then claim that what I said shows I defend Hitler and Stalin, when in fact I was actually saying exactly the opposite.  This is your technique, which you have used over and over again.  I grow weary of wading into the sources you have posted in order to reveal your lies.  I have done it over and over again in the past.  The only sources which actually supported your claims regarding British policy were quigley, yamaguchy and marxists.org.  When you attempted to quote another source, such as Time-Life or a reputatable biography of Chamberlain, in order to lend some credibility to your claims, that source actually contradicted your claims.  You just took limited extracts out of context in order to twist it, as per the example I showed above.   
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 18:15
Originally posted by Bankotsu Bankotsu wrote:


Two weeks after Munich Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke: "Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life

 
How many times have you repeated this particular quote from Baldwin?  10?  12?  What exactly is the relevance for British policy?  Since it seems you are treating us to another spamarama, let me repeat a previous post he you have failed to address.
 
First, can we please avoid turing every thread into the 'spamfest' that your original 'conspiracy theory' thread is?
 
In this thread, you originally posted:

Originally posted by Bankotsu Bankotsu wrote:

Hitler wanted to expand east and Britain encouraged and let Hitler expand eastwards against Russia.

To which I responded:

Originally posted by deadkenny deadkenny wrote:

So now you're going to repeat your 'conspiracy theory' in every thread that even tangentially involves the issue? This is discussed exhaustively in your other thread. Not to carry over the entire argument here, but a brief synopsis for those who do not care to reference that other thread:

Rhineland - west, not east of Germany

Austria - south, not east of Germany

Sudetenland - south, not east of Germany

The one territory that was east of Germany, and would have provided Germany with a common border with the Soviet Union was Poland. Britain declared war on Germany when Germany invaded Poland. Your assertion that 'Britain encouraged and let Hitler expand easwards against Russia.' is false, failing the first and most obvious reality check.

Your reply was:
 
Originally posted by Bankotsu Bankotsu wrote:

deadkenny, I have refuted all of your above points before, but you keep on repeating it over and over.

Why?

So you refuse to agree with my refutations?
 
Now, the definition of 'refute' is:

Originally posted by dictionary dictionary wrote:

"To prove to be false or erroneous; overthrow by argument or proof"

So, the statements of fact which I made were:
 

1. Rhineland - west, not east of Germany

2. Austria - south, not east of Germany

3. Sudetenland - south, not east of Germany

4. None of above provided common border between Germany and S.U.
 
5. Britain declared war on Germany when Germany invaded Poland
 
Now, please point out exactly how you have 'proven to be false or erroneous' all of these five points.  If you respond, please do not go off on another tangent, but for once please try to specifically address these five points which you claim to have 'refuted'.
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 18:22
Originally posted by Choranzanus Choranzanus wrote:

Originally posted by deadkenny deadkenny wrote:

The one territory that was east of Germany, and would have provided Germany with a common border with the Soviet Union was Poland.  Britain declared war on Germany when Germany invaded Poland.  Your assertion that 'Britain encouraged and let Hitler expand easwards against Russia.' is false, failing the first and most obvious reality check. 

But this was after Molotov-Ribentrop pact, when any hope that Germany would attack Soviet Union before France and Britain would have been foolish. So this "most obvious reality check" is actually void.
 
I honestly have no idea what you're trying to say here.  Bankotsu' 'conspiracy theory' is that Britain was trying to lead Germany into a war with the Soviet Union.  Britain gave the guarantee to Poland following Hitler's violation of the Munich agreement.  That was well before the Nazi-Soviet pact.  Britain 'allowed' German expansion into a number of territories that did not provide a common border between Germany and the Soviet Union.  The one country that would have provided that was Poland.  But Britain guaranteed Poland against German aggression, thereby ensuring that Germany would have to 'go west' before they could possibly fight the Soviet Union.  Thus Bankotsu's conspiracy theory is clearly contradicted by the historical facts.  He takes a bunch of anti-Soviet quotes, often out of context, and tries to cobble together 'proof' for his conspiracy theory.  However, if there was any truth to it, Britain should have allowed Germany to invade Poland without interference, as a prelude to an invasion of the Soviet Union.  Instead Britain declared war on Germany.  The British guaranteed forced Hitler into the pact with the Soviets.  The Nazi-Soviet pact didn't trigger the British guarantee. 
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George Santayana
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 18:29
Originally posted by Choranzanus Choranzanus wrote:

Originally posted by deadkenny deadkenny wrote:

Originally posted by Temujin Temujin wrote:

i disagree. 3 is actually really redundant. Hitler was going to get Czechoslovakia anyways, he had already plans to take it by force if he doesn't get it at Munich. this is actually what happened with Danzig which started the war. so appeasement only postponed ww2 but it is most certainly not a cause.

(snip)

I would give Hitler credit for being able to recognize an obviously 'no-win' situation, and back down in time.  Thus appeasement in effect brought on WWII, by allowing Germany to manoeuver themselves into a position where they felt they might reasonably win.  At a minimum it would have taken much longer for Germany to build up to the point where they could have taken on multiple opponents at the same time, without the resources provided by their occupation of Czech territories, or the resources supply to them by the Soviet Union due to the pact.

While I agree with a lot you say Kenny, Temujin is right. Hitler did have plans to attack Czechoslovakia and would certainly do so were it not for Munich. It would not be out of line with his other actions at all. After all, he attacked Poland , France and Britain together and later opened an eastern front. I am strongly opposed to any idea that appeasement had any influence whether war will start or not. Appeasement however, destroyed effective opposition against Hitler, that is correct.

Mere existence of Hitler as a chancellor of Germany made war inevitable, that guy was totally nuts.
 
Yes, however, as I stated Hitler wasn't 'nuts' enough to lead his country into an situation where they obviously had no chance in the short term.  Poland was different because Germany was already much better prepared in fall '39 than they had been in spring or fall '38.  Furthermore, Hitler had an alliance with the Soviets to divide Poland in fall '39.  In '38 the Soviets were obligated by treaty to assist the Czechs if the French did so.  Hitler backed down over Austria in '34, when Il Duce opposed any German move into Austria.  He was prepared to back down in '36 with his move into the Rhineland.  He backed down early in '38 when the Czech's mobilized in response to German moves.  Hitler wanted an 'isolated' war against the Czechs no doubt.  However, would he have gone ahead if France and the Soviet Union had supported the Czechs and the Czechs determined to fight?  No, everything I have seen or read suggests that he would not have.  Germany was still too weak in fall '38 to sustain such a conflict.  One has to look in detail at the German OoB in fall '38 vs. one year later to see clearly why.  But Germany was definitely not ready in fall '38 to take on that list of opponents.  They were barely ready in fall '39, and that was with their alliance with the Soviets.
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George Santayana
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote gcle2003 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 20:21
Originally posted by Gargoyle Gargoyle wrote:


Originally posted by 02bburco 02bburco wrote:

what difference does it matter they had no right to expand thier lands were it was east or west they had to be stopped,


Every country has the right to "expand their lands"...
Only in the sense that every man has the right to steal his neighbour's house, wife, manservant, maidservant, ox, ass or anything else that is his neighbour's.
 
Let alone covet them.
 
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Sparten Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 21:16
Economic causes are insufficently examined. "Living space" was economic in nature after all.
The Germans also take vacations in Paris; especially during the periods they call "blitzkrieg".
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Gundamor Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 05-Aug-2008 at 23:21
Originally posted by deadkenny deadkenny wrote:

However, if there was any truth to it, Britain should have allowed Germany to invade Poland without interference, as a prelude to an invasion of the Soviet Union.  Instead Britain declared war on Germany.  The British guaranteed forced Hitler into the pact with the Soviets.  The Nazi-Soviet pact didn't trigger the British guarantee. 


I'm not defending the conspiracy theory thing but there plenty of political reasons for the crazy pacts and guarantee's that went on. Britain and France had no intent on backing up the guarantee or the British-Polish defense pact that was signed 2 days after the Soviet-Nazi pact. It was their way to legitimately get into a war with Germany. One which they wanted due to fears of the German aggression/expansion and the effects it could have on their Empire's. There was also a hidden clause I believe that was only for German aggression and when the Polish begged for Britain to do something about the Soviet invasion I believe the response was "Britain will decide who it declares war on." So most of these pacts and guarantees were pretty much blowing smoke up the Poles rear end as France and Britain had decided in Paris, without Polish knowledge, that Poland would not be saved or even attempted to be saved in event of a German invasion.

The British and French to some extent wanted world war 2(or at least a war with Nazi Germany) to happen. The Nazi menace was a very serious threat to their empires and spheres of influence and many probably believed that war would inevitably happen either when it did or years down the road.
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote Gargoyle Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 06-Aug-2008 at 03:20
Originally posted by gcle2003 gcle2003 wrote:

Only in the sense that every man has the right to steal his neighbour's house, wife, manservant, maidservant, ox, ass or anything else that is his neighbour's.


Ummmmmmmmm... I think it's a little bit more complicated than that...

An individual is bound by the laws of his or her country and in most cases these days if a person stole their "neighbour's house...etc..." they would get into alot of trouble... unless they were rich and can afford a good lawyer...

When it concerns Countries... it's a bit different... things like politics, big business, alliances and strategic interests come into play...

Admittedly there are things such as International Law and the United Nations... but these can be easily side-stepped and manipulated by countries with great global influence and finance... in recent years the war in IRAQ is an example...

Humans have conquered and killed all throught history... it is nothing to be ashamed of... many empires have been built and many empires have been destroyed... it is a repeating process that will continue well into the future...

Ummmmmmmmm...

When the Duke of Normandy conquered England in 1066 and brought with him a controlling French influence... this has always interested me...
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Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 06-Aug-2008 at 04:16
Originally posted by Gundamor Gundamor wrote:

Originally posted by deadkenny deadkenny wrote:

However, if there was any truth to it, Britain should have allowed Germany to invade Poland without interference, as a prelude to an invasion of the Soviet Union.  Instead Britain declared war on Germany.  The British guaranteed forced Hitler into the pact with the Soviets.  The Nazi-Soviet pact didn't trigger the British guarantee. 


I'm not defending the conspiracy theory thing but there plenty of political reasons for the crazy pacts and guarantee's that went on. Britain and France had no intent on backing up the guarantee or the British-Polish defense pact that was signed 2 days after the Soviet-Nazi pact. It was their way to legitimately get into a war with Germany. One which they wanted due to fears of the German aggression/expansion and the effects it could have on their Empire's. There was also a hidden clause I believe that was only for German aggression and when the Polish begged for Britain to do something about the Soviet invasion I believe the response was "Britain will decide who it declares war on." So most of these pacts and guarantees were pretty much blowing smoke up the Poles rear end as France and Britain had decided in Paris, without Polish knowledge, that Poland would not be saved or even attempted to be saved in event of a German invasion.

The British and French to some extent wanted world war 2(or at least a war with Nazi Germany) to happen. The Nazi menace was a very serious threat to their empires and spheres of influence and many probably believed that war would inevitably happen either when it did or years down the road.
 
I agree to a certain extent.  The guarantee (which was offered unilaterally much earlier in 1939 - it was only the 'formal' agreement which was signed later) was not, from the British perspective, going to mean that Poland would be 'protected' from German aggression.  That was of course impossible.  The British view was that Poland would probably be overrun in the early course of the war, as Serbia had been in WWI.  The British view was that Poland would be reconstituted once the war was won by Britain and France et al.  Now, that wasn't the view of the Poles, who expected some active assistance from their allies BEFORE they were conquered by Germany (and the Soviets from the east, which was not originally anticipated).  The French had a much earlier pre-existing treaty with Poland, which promised assistance on the basis of a situation which no longer existed - i.e. a demilitarized Rhineland.  When it came to it, the French preferred to 're-fight WWI' by remaining on the defense and 'containing' the initial German attack before counterattacking, as at the Marne in WWI. 
 
However, I agree with your view that the British guarantee was not intended to 'protect' Poland, but rather to deter and then contain German aggression and expansion.  Germany gaining limited territories of predominantly German population was one thing, but the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in violation of Munich and the conquest of Poland were not acceptable to the British.  Again this is all in direct contradiction of the conspiracy theory being put forward by Bankotsu.


Edited by deadkenny - 06-Aug-2008 at 04:17
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...The German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 marked the turning point for the Milner Group, but not for the Chamberlain group.  In the June 1939 issue, the leading article of The Round Table was entitled “From Appeasement to Grand Alliance.”  Without expressing any regrets about the past, which it regarded as embodying the only possible policy, it rejected appeasement in the future.

 It demanded a “grand alliance” of Poland, Rumania, France, Britain, and others.  Only one sentence referred to Russia;  it said:  “Negotiations to include Soviet Russia in the system are continuing.”  Most of the article justified the previous policy as inevitable in a world of sovereign states.  Until federation abolishes sovereignty and creates a true world government amenable to public opinion, the nations will continue to live in anarchy, whatever their contractual obligations may be;  and under conditions of anarchy it is power and not public opinion that counts. ... The fundamental, though not the only, explanation of the tragic history of the last eight years is to be found in the failure of the English-speaking democracies to realize that they could prevent aggression only by unity and by being strongly armed enough to resist it wherever it was attempted.”...

...From this point onward, the course of the Milner Group was more rigid against Germany.  This appeared chiefly as an increased emphasis on rearmament and national service, policies which the Group had been supporting for a long time.

Unlike the Chamberlain group, they learned a lesson from the events of 15 March 1939.  It would be a mistake, however, to believe that they were determined to resist any further acquisition of territory or economic advantage by Germany.  Not at all.  They would undoubtedly have been willing to allow frontier rectifications in the Polish Corridor or elsewhere in favor of Germany, if these were accomplished by a real process of negotiation and included areas inhabited by Germans, and if the economic interests of Poland, such as her trade outlet to the Baltic, were protected.  In this the Milner Group were still motivated by ideas of fairness and justice and by a desire to avoid a war.  The chief changes were two:  (1) they now felt, as they (in contrast to Chamberlain’s group) had long suspected, that peace could be preserved better by strength than by weakness;  and (2) they now felt that Hitler would not stop at any point based only on justice but was seeking world domination. 

The short-run goal of the Milner Group still remained a Continent dominated by Hitler between an Oceanic Bloc on the west and the Soviet Union on the east.  That they assumed such a solution could keep the peace, even on a short-term basis, shows the fundamental naïvete of the Milner Group. 

The important point is that this view did not prohibit any modification of the Polish frontiers;  not did it require any airtight understanding with the Soviet Union.  It did involve an immediate rearming of Britain and a determination to stop Hitler if he moved by force again.  Of these three points, the first two were shared with the Chamberlain group;  the third was not. 

The difference rested on the fact that the Chamberlain group hoped to permit Britain to escape from the necessity of fighting Germany by getting Russia to fight Germany.  The Chamberlain group did not share the Milner Group’s naive belief in the possibility of three great power blocs standing side by side in peace.  Lacking that belief, they preferred a German-Russian war to a British-German war. 

And, having that preference, they differed from the Milner Group in their willingness to accept the partition of Poland by Germany.  The Milner Group would have yielded parts of Poland to Germany if done by fair negotiation.  The Chamberlain group was quite prepared to liquidate Poland entirely, if it could be presented to the British people in terms which they would accept without demanding war. 

Here again appeared the difference we have already mentioned between the Milner Group and Lloyd George in 1918 and between the Group and Baldwin in 1923, namely that the Milner Group tended to neglect the electoral considerations so important to a party politician.

In 1939 Chamberlain was primarily interested in building up to a victorious electoral campaign for November, and, as Sir Horace Wilson told German Special Representative Wohl in June, “it was all one to the Government whether the elections were held under the cry `Be Ready for a Coming War’ or under a cry `A Lasting Understanding with Germany.' ”

...These distinctions between the point of view of the Milner Group and that of the Chamberlain group are very subtle and have nothing in common with the generally accepted idea of a contrast between appeasement and resistance.  There were still appeasers to be found, chiefly in those ranks of the Conservative Party most remote from the Milner Group;  British public opinion was quite clearly committed to resistance after March 1939.

The two government groups between these, with the Chamberlain group closer to the former and the Milner Group closer to the latter.  It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant. 

The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue.  The Milner Group was anti-appeasement after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia...


...The events of 1939 do not require our extended attention here, although they have never yet been narrated in any adequate fashion.  The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was not much of a surprise to either the Milner or Chamberlain groups;  both accepted it, but the former tried to use it as a propaganda device to help get conscription, while the latter soon discovered that, whatever their real thoughts, they must publicly condemn it in order to satisfy the outraged moral feelings of the British electorate.  It is this which explains the change in tone between Chamberlain’s speech of 15 March in Commons and his speech of 17 March in Birmingham.  The former was what he thought;  the latter was what he thought the voters wanted...


...The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted.  He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee.  The Milner Group, less susceptible to public opinion, did not want the guarantee to Poland at all.  As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.” 

This was interpreted by the leading article of The Times for 1 April to leave the way open to territorial revision without revoking the guarantee.  This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain in Commons on 3 April.  Apparently the government believed that it was making no real commitment because, if war broke out in eastern Europe, British public opinion would force the government to declare war on Germany, no matter what the government itself wanted, and regardless whether the guarantee existed or not.

On the other hand, a guarantee to Poland might deter Hitler from precipitating a war and give the government time to persuade the Polish government to yield the Corridor to Germany.  If the Poles could not be persuaded, or if Germany marched, the fat was in the fire anyway;  if the Poles could be persuaded to yield, the guarantee was so worded that Britain could not act under it to prevent such yielding.  This was to block any possibility that British public opinion might refuse to accept a Polish Munich.

That this line of thought was not far distant from British government circles is indicated by a Reuters news dispatch released on the same day that Chamberlain gave the guarantee to Poland.  This dispatch indicated that, under cover of the guarantee, Britian would put pressure on Poland to make substantial concessions to Hitler through negotiations.  According to Hugh Dalton, Labour M.P., speaking in Commons on 3 April, this dispatch was inspired by the government and was issued through either the Foreign Office, Sir Horace Wilson, John Simon, or Samuel Hoare. 

Three of these four were of the Milner Group, the fourth being the personal agent of Chamberlain.  Dalton’s charge was not denied by any government spokesman, Hoare contenting himself with a request to Dalton “to justify that statement.”  Another M.P. of Churchill’s group suggested that Geoffrey Dawson was the source, but Dalton rejected this.

It is quite clear that neither the Chamberlain group nor the Milner Group wanted an alliance with the Soviet Union to stop Hitler in 1939, and that the negotiations were not sincere or vigorously pursued.  The Milner Group was not so opposed to such an agreement as the Chamberlain group.  Both were committed to the four-power pact.  In the case of the Chamberlain group, this pact could easily have developed into an anti-Russian alliance, but in the case of the Milner Group it was regarded merely as a link between the Oceanic Bloc and a Germanic Mitteleuropa.

Both groups hated and despised the Soviet Union, but the Milner Group did not fear it as the Chamberlain group did.  This fear was based on the Marxist threat to the British economic system, and the Milner Group was not wedded nearly as closely to that system as Chamberlain and his friends.  The Toynbee-Milner tradition, however weak it had become by 1939, was enough to prevent the two groups from seeing eye to eye on this issue.

The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.  These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany.  These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis.

One of these offers revolved around a semi-official economic agreement under which British and German industrialists would form cartel agreements in all fields to fix prices of their products and divide up the world’s market.  The Milner Group apparently objected to this on the grounds that it was aimed, or could be aimed, at the United States.  Nevertheless, the agreements continued;  a master agreement, negotiated at Dusseldorf between representatives of British and German industry, was signed in London on 16 March 1939.  A British government mission to Berlin to help Germany exploit the newly acquired areas of eastern Europe was postponed the same day because of the strength of public feeling against Germany.  As soon as this had died down, secret efforts were made through R.S. Hudson, secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, to negotiate with Helmuth Wohlthat, Reich Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, who was in London to negotiate an international whaling agreement.

Although Wholthat had no powers, he listened to Hudson and later to Sir Horace Wilson, but refused to discuss the matter with Chamberlain.  Wilson offered:  (1) a non-aggression pact with Germany;  (2) a delimitation of spheres among the Great Powers;  (3) colonial concessions in Africa along the lines previously mentioned;  (4) an economic agreement.  These conversations, reported to Berlin by Ambassador Dirksen in a dispatch of 21 July 1939, would have involved giving Germany a free hand in eastern Europe and bringing her into collision with Russia. 

One sentence of Dirksen’s says:  “Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would enable Britian to rid herself of her commitments vis-a-vis Poland.”  In another report, three days later, Dirksen said:  “Public opinion is so inflamed, and the warmongers and intriguers are so much in the ascendancy, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to become public they would immediately be torpedoed by Churchill and other incendiaries with the cry 'No second Munich !' ”

The truth of this statement was seen when news of the Hudson-Wohlthat conversations did leak out and resulted in a violent controversy in the House of Commons, in which the Speaker of the House repeatedly broke off the debate to protect the government.  According to Press Adviser Hesse in the German Embassy in London, the leak was made by the French Embassy to force a break in the negotiations.  The negotiations, however, were already bogging down because of the refusal of the Germans to become very interested in them.  Hitler and Ribbentrop by this time despised the British so thoroughly that they paid no attention to them at all, and the German Ambassador in London found it impossible to reach Ribbentrop, his official superior, either by dispatch or personally. 

Chamberlain, however, in his eagerness to make economic concessions to Germany, gave to Hitler £6 million in Czechoslovak gold in the Bank of England, and kept Lord Runciman busy training to be chief economic negotiator in the great agreement which he envisaged.  On 29 July 1939, Kordt, the German charge d’affaires in London, had a long talk with Charles Roden Buxton, brother of the Labour Peer Lord Noel-Buxton, about the terms of this agreement, which was to be patterned on the agreement of 1907 between Britain and Russia.  Buxton insisted that his visit was quite unofficial, but Kordt was inclined to believe that his visit was a feeler from the Chamberlain group.

In view of the close parallel between Buxton’s views and Chamberlain’s, this seems very likely.  This was corroborated when Sir Horace Wilson repeated these views in a highly secret conversation with Dirksen at Wilson’s home from 4 to 6 p.m. on 3 August 1939.  Dirksen’s minute of the same day shows that Wilson’s aims had not changed.  He wanted a four-power pact, a free hand for Germany in eastern Europe, a colonial agreement, an economic agreement, etc. 

The memorandum reads, in part:  “After recapitulating his conversation with Wohlthat, Sir Horace Wilson expatiated at length on the great risk Chamberlain would incur by starting confidential negotiations with the German Government.  If anything about them were to leak out there would be a grand scandal, and Chamberlain would probably be forced to resign.”  Dirksen did not see how any binding agreement could be reached under conditions such as this;  “for example, owing to Hudson’s indiscretion, another visit of Herr Wohlthat to London was out of the question.”  To this, Wilson suggested that “the two emissaries could meet in Switzerland or elsewhere.”  The political portions of this conversation were largely repeated in an interview that Dirksen had with Lord Halifax on 9 August 1939.[18]

It was not possible to conceal these activities completely from the public, and, indeed, government spokesmen referred to them occasionally in trial balloons.  On 3 May, Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German non-aggression pact, although only five days earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934.  As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the Poles.[19]

This, however, was a personal statement and probably went further than Halifax would have been willing to go by 1939.  Halifax apparently had little faith in Chamberlain’s ability to obtain any settlement with the Germans.  If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it.  It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States. 

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland.  Instead, he sought to get nothing more than a unilateral Russian guarantee to Poland to match the British guarantee to the same country.

This was much too dangerous for Russia to swallow, since it would leave her with a commitment which could lead to war and with no promise of British aid to her if she were attacked directly, after a Polish settlement, or indirectly across the Baltic States.  Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland.  This was done to warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion.

Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain.  Even after the German attack on Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three days asking the Germans to return to negotiation.  Even after the British were forced to declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with dropping leaflets on Germany.  We now know that the German generals had moved so much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html


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 **This post has been edited to all but one sentence due to CoC violations. Bankotsu has not provided a commentary. Since this is the case with many of his posts on this page and since we are left to assume that the linked reference is part of his arguement in this thread all of his copy/pasting posts are subject to removal. 
 
11. Plagiarism, the posting of texts found elsewhere without naming either author or source. Posting your own personal commentary is encouraged when copy/pasting from another source. When pasting attempt to place the content in quotes, highlight or underline for presentation purposes. Provide a correct URL link. When referencing from books or periodicals provide the title of the reference, the author and publication date. Posts where the paste is the arguement itself, while not adhering to these requirements, will be deleted.** edited by Seko
 
Plans for appeasement by Chamberlain and plans for aggression by Hitler did not end with Munich....

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46

 



Edited by Seko - 07-Aug-2008 at 15:25
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…Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or been so well preserved as in Britain. In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward.

As if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view:

(1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center,
(2) the “three-bloc-world” supporters close to the center,
(3) the supporters of “appeasement,” and
(4) the “peace at any price” group in a peripheral position.


The “anti-Bolsheviks,” who were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real policy of the government in 1939. In the earlier period the chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D’Abernon, and General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit German rearmament, and tear down what they called “French militarism.”

This point of view was supported by the second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor.

It included Lord Milner, Leopold Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian, Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand (brother-in-law of Lady Astor and managing director of Lazard Brothers, the international bankers), Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates. This group wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table (founded in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes Trust, and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal Institute of International Affairs, called “Chatham House” (of which Sir Abe Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters, while Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford.

This Round Table Group formed the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from the anti-Bolsheviks like D’Abernon in that they sought to contain the Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an English-speaking bloc rather than to destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Relationships between the two groups were very close and friendly, and some people, like Smuts, were in both. The anti-Bolsheviks, including D’Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany.

Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in a letter of August 11, 1920, from D’Abernon to Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922) to Lausanne (1932).

D’Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain “with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet.” As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D’Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission).

The point of view of this group was presented by General Smuts in a speech of October 23, 1923 (made after luncheon with H. A. L. Fisher). From these two groups came the Dawes Plan and the Locarno pacts. It was Smuts, according to Stresemann, who first suggested the Locarno policy, and it was D’Abernon who became its chief supporter. H. A. L. Fisher and John Simon in the House of Commons, and Lothian, Dawson, and their friends on The Round Table and on The Times prepared the ground among the British governing class for both the Dawes Plan and Locarno as early as 1923 (The Round Table for March 1923; the speeches of Fisher and Simon in the House of Commons on February 19, 1923, Fisher’s speech of March 6th and Simon’s speech of March 13th in the same place, The Round Table for June 1923; and Smuts’s speech of October 23rd).

The more moderate Round Table group, including Lionel Curtis, Leopold Amery (who was the shadow of Lord Milner), Lord Lothian, Lord Brand, and Lord Astor, sought to weaken the League of Nations and destroy all possibility of collective security in order to strengthen Germany in respect to both France and the Soviet Union, and above all to free Britain from Europe in order to build up an “Atlantic bloc” of Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the United States.

They prepared the way for this “Union” through the Rhodes Scholarship organization (of which Lord Milner was the head in 1905-1925 and Lord Lothian was secretary in 1925-1940), through the Round Table groups (which had been set up in the United States, India, and the British Dominions in 1910- 1917), through the Chatham House organization, which set up Royal Institutes of International Affairs in all the dominions and a Council on Foreign Relations in New York, as well as through “Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences” held irregularly, and the Institutes of Pacific Relations set up in various countries as autonomous branches of the Royal Institutes of International Affairs.

This influential group sought to change the League of Nations from an instrument of collective security to an international conference center for “nonpolitical” matters like drug control or international postal services, to rebuild Germany as a buffer against the Soviet Union and a counterpoise to France, and to build up an Atlantic bloc of Britain, the Dominions, the United States, and, if possible, the Scandinavian countries.

One of the effusions of this group was the project called Union Now, and later Union Now with Great Britain, propagated in the United States in 1938-1945 by Clarence Streit on behalf of Lord Lothian and the Rhodes Trust. Ultimately, the inner circle of this group arrived at the idea of the “three-bloc world.”

It was believed that this system could force Germany to keep the peace (after it absorbed Europe) because it would be squeezed between the Atlantic bloc and the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union could be forced to keep the peace because it would be squeezed between Japan and Germany.

This plan would work only if Germany and the Soviet Union could be brought into contact with each other by abandoning to Germany Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Polish Corridor. This became the aim of both the anti-Bolsheviks and the three-bloc people from the early part of 1937 to the end of 1939 (or even early 1940).

These two cooperated and dominated the government in that period. They split in the period 1939-1940, with the “three-bloc” people, like Amery, Lord Halifax, and Lord Lothian, becoming increasingly anti-German, while the anti-Bolshevik crowd, like Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, and John Simon, tried to adopt a policy based on a declared but unfought war against Germany combined with an undeclared fighting war against the Soviet Union.

The split between these two groups appeared openly in public and led to Chamberlain’s fall from office when Amery cried to Chamberlain, across the floor of the House of Commons, on May 10, 1940, “In the name of God, go!”

Outside these two groups, and much more numerous (but much more remote from the real instruments of government), were the appeasers and the “peace at any price” people. These were both used by the two inner groups to command public support for their quite different policies. Of the two the appeasers were much more important than the “peace at any price” people.

The appeasers swallowed the steady propaganda (much of it emanating from Chatman House, The Times, the Round Table groups, or Rhodes circles) that the Germans had been deceived and brutally treated in 1919. For example, it was under pressure from seven persons, including General Smuts and H. A. L. Fisher, as well as Lord Milner himself, that Lloyd George made his belated demand on June 2, 1919, that the German reparations be reduced and the Rhineland occupation be cut from fifteen years to two.

The memorandum from which Lloyd George read these demands was apparently drawn up by Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), while the minutes of the Council of Four, from which we get the record of those demands, were taken down by Sir Maurice Hankey (as secretary to the Supreme Council, a position obtained through Lord Esher).

It was Kerr (Lothian) who served as British member of the Committee of Five which drew up the answer to the Germans’ protest of May, 1 919. General Smuts was still refusing to sign the treaty because it was too severe as late as June 23, 1919.

As a result of these attacks and a barrage of similar attacks on the treaty which continued year after year, British public opinion acquired a guilty conscience about the Treaty of Versailles, and was quite unprepared to take any steps to enforce it by 1930. On this feeling, which owed so much to the British idea of sportsmanlike conduct toward a beaten opponent, was built the movement for appeasement.

This movement had two basic assumptions: (a) that reparation must be made for Britain’s treatment of Germany in 1919 and (b) that if Germany’s most obvious demands, such as arms equality, remilitarization of the Rhineland, and perhaps union with Austria, were met, Germany would become satisfied and peaceful.

The trouble with this argument was that once Germany reached this point, it would be very difficult to prevent Germany from going further (such as taking the Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor).

Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or “three-bloc” point of view, while some even went into the “peace at any price” group.

It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized, it seemed to many that the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even collision with, the Soviet Union.

The “peace at any price” people were both few and lacking in influence in Britain, while the contrary, as we shall see, was true in France. However, in the period August 1935 to March 1939 and especially in September 1938, the government built upon the fears of this group by steadily exaggerating Germany’s armed might and belittling their own, by calculated indiscretions (like the statement in September 1938 that there were no real antiaircraft defenses in London), by constant hammering at the danger of an overwhelming air attack without warning, by building ostentatious and quite useless air-raid trenches in the streets and parks of London, and by insisting through daily warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask immediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil).

In this way, the government put London into a panic in 1938 for the first time since 1804 or even 1678. And by this panic, Chamberlain was able to get the British people to accept the destruction of Czechoslovakia, wrapping it up in a piece of paper, marked “peace in our time,” which he obtained from Hitler, as he confided to that ruthless dictator, “for British public opinion.”

Once this panic passed, Chamberlain found it impossible to get the British public to follow his program, although he himself never wavered, even in 1940.

He worked on the appeasement and the “peace at any price” groups throughout 1939, but their numbers dwindled rapidly, and since he could not openly appeal for support on either the anti-Bolshevik or the “three-bloc” basis, he had to adopt the dangerous expedient of pretending to resist (in order to satisfy the British public) while really continuing to make every possible concession to Hitler which would bring Germany to a common frontier with the Soviet Union, all the while putting every pressure on Poland to negotiate and on Germany to refrain from using force in order to gain time to wear Poland down and in order to avoid the necessity of backing up by action his pretense of resistance to Germany.

This policy went completely astray in the period from August 1939 to April 1940.

Chamberlain’s motives were not bad ones; he wanted peace so that he could devote Britain’s “limited resources” to social welfare; but he was narrow and totally ignorant of the realities of power, convinced that international politics could be conducted in terms of secret deals, as business was, and he was quite ruthless in carrying out his aims, especially in his readiness to sacrifice non-English persons, who, in his eyes, did not count…

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
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...And by this date, certain members of the Milner Group and of the British Conservative government had reached the fantastic idea that they could kill two birds with one stone by setting Germany and Russia against one another in Eastern Europe.

In this way they felt that the two enemies would stalemate one another, or that Germany would become satisfied with the oil of Rumania and the wheat of the Ukraine.

It never occurred to anyone in a responsible position that Germany and Russia might make common cause, even temporarily, against the West.  Even less did it occur to them that Russia might beat Germany and thus open all Central Europe to Bolshevism.

This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group.  Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group. 

The two policies followed parallel courses until March 1939.  After that date the Milner Group’s disintegration became very evident, and part of it took the form of the movement of several persons (like Hoare and Simon) from the second circle of the Milner Group to the inner circle of the new group rotating around Chamberlain. 

This process was concealed by the fact that this new group was following, in public at least, the policy desired by the Milner Group;  their own policy, which was really the continuation of appeasement for another year after March 1939, was necessarily secret, so that the contrast between the Chamberlain group and the inner circle of the Milner Group in the period after March 1939 was not as obvious as it might have been.

In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia; 

(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries;  and

(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem. 

The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the implications of their policy and tried to reverse it...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html



Edited by Bankotsu - 06-Aug-2008 at 06:07
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Secret talks between Hitler and Chamberlain, who tries to bribe Germany

The story was leaked by the French, who feared the British were selling them out to Germany. There was an instant clamour in the press and political circles. The UK government's embarrassment was compounded by the German response. Hitler rejected the offer 'with indignation'. Hudson's proposal for a loan supposedly linked to German disarmament was dismissed as 'the fantasy of a government which has lost its grip on reality'. Hitler denounced an 'arrogant and shameless' offer which suggested Britain thought she was dealing with a 'defeated enemy'.

But Dirksen's papers revealed a much more sinister story of Anglo-German collusion designed to conceal the real, and far more substantive negotiations going on by means of a synthetic hullabaloo over Hudson's 'offer'.

These negotiations had begun more than a month earlier.

Dirksen explained the reasons for secrecy: 'the problem which is puzzling the sponsors of these plans [i.e. Chamberlain and Halifax] most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so inflamed that if plans to negotiate with Germany became public they would immediately be torpedoed'. Discussions took place between Hitler's economic adviser Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson, a member of Chamberlain's kitchen cabinet. The essence of Chamberlain's proposal, relayed to Wohlthat, was as follows.

Wohlthat was told 'there were still three big regions in the world where Germany and England could find wide opportunities for activity: the British Empire, China and Russia. England alone could not adequately take care of her vast empire and it would be quite possible for Germany to be given a rather comprehensive share. Just as little could Japan satisfy all China economically; in Russia the situation was similar'. Wilson went on to say that 'the British government had in view the conclusion of two pacts with Germany: the first on non-aggression and the second on non-intervention' in exchange for which, Chamberlain 'would end the British "guarantee" policy and agree to an acceptable settlement of the problems (sic) in Eastern Europe'.

Additionally, the British would prevail on France to abrogate her Mutual Assistance Pact with Russia and abandon all her ties in South-East Europe. It was made clear that the British 'guarantee' to Poland was nothing more than a device to achieve the main aim- a broad alliance with Hitler Germany.

The British wanted a 'non-intervention pact' in order to secure a general demarcation of spheres of influence throughout the world; this would be combined with an economic agreement which amounted to an eventual coalescing of the German and British economies in a mutual exploitation of each country's colonial empires.

There was discussion of the 'need to open and exploit' world markets- including China and the USSR. Just in case anything had been left out, Wilson commented that, if Hitler had any other demands, 'the Fuhrer only has to take a clean sheet of paper and list the questions he is interested in'. These talks were continued in Berlin through early August, when Britain also agreed 'to recognize East Europe as Germany's natural lebensraum (living space)'; to settle the colonial question and end 'Germany's encirclement'.

'Agreement with Germany is still Britain's dearest wish' wrote Dirksen. British efforts to woo Hitler continued into August. Sir Horace Wilson met Fritz Hesse, a Ribbentrop aide, at his Kensington town house to convey a new offer by Chamberlain to conclude a 25-year 'defensive alliance' with Germany. Hesse wanted clarification: did this mean the British would take Germany's side in a war with the Soviet Union? Wilson replied that it did.

Hitler did not respond directly to the latest British overtures. His main concern was that the Soviet Union might still manage to persuade the French and British to negotiate seriously for a mutual assistance pact. His own overtures to the Soviet Government for a Non-aggression Treaty now became more insistent; and they were buttressed, of course, with the plentiful evidence of British bad faith now available to Hitler.

In any case, Hitler had no worries about the likely British response to a German attack on Poland; he was now convinced, and could hardly be otherwise, that Britain would not go to war for the sake of Poland.

Even if the British and French were obliged to honour their 'guarantees' to the extent of declaring war, the Reich would be in no actual danger from the West. So confident was Hitler of this that Germany's western borders were left undefended while the Wehrmacht was hurled at Poland...

http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm


Memorandum of German Ambassador in London Dirksen regarding
Wohlthat's Conversations with Wilson and Hudson (July 21 1939)

http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQCSpVMC&pg=RA1


...The seven made their separate ways to Sylt for the meeting. Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland.

This offer, authorised by the leading appeaser Lord Halifax, shocked Halifax's biographer Roberts, who had not found any reference to this last-minute offer in either Foreign Office documents or Halifax's private papers. Aberconway showed Roberts 38 pages of documents...

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/12/1044927661990.html



...If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it. 

It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html



Edited by Bankotsu - 06-Aug-2008 at 06:44
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Once again we are 'treated' to a deluge of yamaguch, quigley and twisted out of context extracts from a few other sources.  This is in no way shape or form a response to what anyone else has posted, nor is it your own words or analysis.  Once again it is nothing but....
 
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Yes, I'm afraid it is just a regurgitation of stuff which has been put on innumerable threads around the internet.
 
The volume doesn't make it any the less rubbish
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I also wonder about the copyright issues regarding copy/pasting such large excerpts from another source without any accompanying comment or analysis.  Fair use doctrine usually requires such a context, and that is typically the only justification for 'copying' ANYTHING at all.
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Originally posted by Peteratwar Peteratwar wrote:

The volume doesn't make it any the less rubbish


Peteratwar, I would like you to give the reasons explaining clearly why "Britain turn Germany eastwards to destroy Soviet Union" is rubbish.

Thanks.


Edited by Bankotsu - 07-Aug-2008 at 01:28
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Letter from WSC to Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, thanks for letter on the European political situation. Commenting that a strong and growing section of Conservative opinion agreed with Tudor that Britain should form a strong Western Alliance with France and Germany, leaving Germany free to deal with the Soviet Union...

http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?search_id=1174516;sort


Two weeks after Munich Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke:

"Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same".


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life


Henry "Chips" Channon MP put it this way: "we should let gallant little Germany
glut her fill of the Reds in the East and keep decadent France quiet while she does
so".


http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8tJuB2AEDogC&pg


...There is one danger, of course, which has probably been in all your minds - supposing the Russians and Germans got fighting and the French went in as allies of Russia owing to that appalling pact they made, you would not feel you were obligated to go and help France, would you? If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it...

- British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, July 1936

http://books.google.com/books?id=qVMXHWtCeAUC&pg


...Eden noted in his diary after talks with Hitler:"Only thing Hitler wants is Air Pact without limitation. Simon much inclined to bite at this....I had to protest and he gave up the idea.... Simon toys with the idea of letting Germany expand eastwards...

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=UyMXon0JmBsC&pg=PA107&lpg


...He alluded to a luncheon meeting of 10 May 1938 hosted by Lady Astor, where Chamberlain reportedly communicated to twelve American journalists his secret plans concerning a Four-Power Pact in Europe, with the exclusion of Russia.
The Premier also stated at that time that he was in favor of ceding the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia to the Germans...

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=KWQcos95hHsC&pg=P


...In a meeting between British and French leaders immediately before Munich, Chamberlain made the following extremely revealing intervention: "There had been indications that there might be in the minds of the German Government an idea that they could begin the disruption of Russia by the encouragement of agitation for an independent Ukraine"...

http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/History/Appease.html


...In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html


Edited by Bankotsu - 07-Aug-2008 at 04:20
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Originally posted by Sparten Sparten wrote:

Economic causes are insufficently examined. "Living space" was economic in nature after all.
 
Yes. In fact if one is actually looking for the causes of WW2 instead of just trying to propagandise, you have to consider both Asia and Europe. And 'living space' was something both Japan and Germany were seeking. Moreover they were both beginning to suffer from lack of access to raw materials, not just oil.
 
You didn't have to be a crazed antisemite to lead Germany into war in or around 1940, just an ardent nationalist, like those leading Japan.
 
WW2 was a global phenomenon and so were its causes. What as lucky was that there was no third-force threat arising from any of the South American countries to challenge the US.
 
Citizen of Ankh-Morpork
Never believe anything until it has been officially denied - Sir Humphrey Appleby, 1984.
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